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Airport Approach -

Height Zoning

-

Constitutionality

Plaintiffs, owners of land adjacent to a private airport, brought suit
against the defendant county on the theory of inverse condemnation. The
plaintiffs contended that the county, through a series of ordinances and
administrative actions, deprived plaintiffs of the use and value of their
property. In an attempt to develop a countywide system of airports to
serve all the aviation needs of the community, the county expressed an
intention to purchase Phoenix Field, a small private airfield. In furtherance of this basic idea, in April of 1960, a zoning ordinance was passed,
applying only to the land around Phoenix Field, which was designed to
protect the approach paths from obstructions. The adjacent landowners
were required to maintain a clear airspace ratio of 20:1; that is, the
ordinance limited the height of structures or vegetation to one foot of
elevation for every twenty feet of distance extending from either end of
the runway for 10,000 feet.' In 1963, the area was re-zoned so as to be
slightly more restrictive in height limitations. At this same time, the
county adopted definite plans to procure the airfield and the surrounding
land, including portions of plaintiff's property. However, in 1965, the
county abandoned its Phoenix Field Plan, due to difficulties in the negotiation over the price of the airport proper, and rescinded the height ordinance. In plaintiff's suit against the county, the trial court held that the
acts by the county constituted inverse condemnation. The court found that
the "taking" had occurred in November of 1963 when the county formally
adopted a general plan. The defendant county appealed the judgment
rendered for the plaintiffs. Held, affirmed: A height restrictive, zoning
ordinance coupled with administrative action by a county constitutes a
taking of private property when the impact of these actions is to prevent
development of the property. Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal.
App. 487, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
Zoning has traditionally been viewed as a legitimate exercise of police
power when reasonably related to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare.! But, when a zoning ordinance unreasonably restricts the
use or enjoyment of property or bears no reasonable relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare, it is unconstitutional because the
individual is deprived of property without due process of law.' It should
be noted that the police power involved in zoning is distinguishable from
the power of eminent domain, both because the eminent domain power
'See Technical Standard Order of the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Department of
Commerce, TSO-N18.
"Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926);
see also Charles S. Rhyme, Municipal Corporations § 32-2 (1957).
'Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016
(1926); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922).
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presupposes no requirement of reasonableness, and because it "involves
a taking of private property for a public use or a public purpose; whereas
the police power, when exerted with respect of property rights, involves a
regulation of private property in the public interest."4 The inverse condemnation action is available to aid in maintaining the distinction between
the two, that is, inverse condemnation has been defined as a "term used
to describe a course of action against a governmental defendant to recover
the value of property which has been taken in fact, even though no
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by
the taking agency." ' Thus, when a local government exercises its police
power in enacting a zoning ordinance which deprives a property owner
of all beneficial use of his property for the sake of the public good, the
governmental body has in effect "taken" the property without just compensation.' In many cases such an ordinance is said to be unconstitutional
because it is unreasonable.7 This is the test generally applied in zoning
cases! However, in certain instances zoning ordinances have been held to
be unconstitutional as constituting a "taking" without ever reaching the
test of reasonableness The test of reasonableness seems to be completely
avoided where the court feels the questioned ordinance clearly constitutes
a "taking" of private property without the formal exercise of the power
of eminent domain.
Thus, the cases dealing with the constitutionality of airport approach
height zoning can be divided into two basic groups. The minority"
cases' view such zoning as mere regulation and apply a test of reasonableness, just as applied in other zoning cases. The leading minority case is
Harrell's Candy Kitchen Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority. 3
In that case, the Supreme Court of Florida held an airport approach height
zoning ordinance to be a valid exercise of police power. The court stated
that the applicable principles of law were that "zoning regulations duly
enacted pursuant to lawful authority are presumptively valid and that the
burden is upon him who attacks such regulation to carry the extraordinary
burden of both alleging and proving that it is unreasonable and bears no
substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare."' 4
4

C. Rhyme, Municipal Corporations, § 26-3 (1957).
Ferguson v. City of Keene, 108 N.H. 409, 238 A.2d 1, 2 (1967).
' Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922).
vC.J.S. Zoning § 68, 29.
'Id. at § 5.
'Indiana Toll Road Commission v. Jankovich, 193 N.E. 2d 237 (Ind. 1963); Sneed v. County
of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205 32 Cal. Rptr. 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
" The exceptions to this generalization are decided on the basis of the lack of an enabling act
authorizing any airport height zoning. See Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L.
370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945) and Rice v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 387, 40 A.2d 561 (1945).
a" The majority-minority designation is employed merely as an indication of the number of
cases falling into each group.
"Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111 So.2d 439 (Fla.
1959); Waring v. Peterson, 137 So.2d 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1962); Mutual Chemical Co. v. City
of Baltimore, 1939 U.S. Av. 11 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1939).
13111 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
1,Id. at 443. See also Waring v. Peterson, 137 So.2d 268 Fla. Dist. Ct. 1962); Mutual Chemical
Co. v. City of Baltimore, 1939 U.S. Av. 11 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1939).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 36

The court held specifically that the ordinance which restricted the height
of structures in approach paths was reasonable.
The majority" of courts, however, seem to distinguish the normal zoning
ordinance, which regulates use of property, from the airport, height zoning ordinance which prohibits all use of portions of property by the
property owner. " In the case of Indiana Toll Road Commission v. Jankovich, " the court noted, in passing on the validity of an airport approach
height zoning ordinance, that "mere regulation under police power which
can be modified at the discretion of the regulation authority is wholly
different from taking or appropriating of private property by the government for a specific use."'" The California court in Sneed v. County of
Riverside" found a "distinction between the commonly accepted and traditional height restrictions zoning regulation of buildings and zoning of
buildings and zoning of airport approaches in that the latter contemplates
actual use by aircraft of the airspace zoned, whereas in the building cases
there is no invasion or trespass to the area above the restricted zone. '
In the Sneed case, the plaintiff appealed from an order of dismissal and
contended that the airport approach height zoning ordinance, in effect,
gave the county an air easement over property. The court stated the basic
issue to be whether the "ordinance is in reality a height limit ordinance
authorized under the police power or whether it takes an air easement over
plaintiff's property without payment of compensation therefore.""
In the instant case," the defendant county appealed from the trial court's
finding of inverse condemnation. The trial court had found that the actions of the county were "unreasonable and oppressive, constituting a compensable taking of plaintiff's land."' On appeal the county first argued that
its action in zoning the area was of no additional restrictive effect because
the California Public Utilities Code, Section 21402 and 21403, provides
for public right of flight over land and an unobstructed right of access
to public airports. The court dismissed the contention by citing Anderson
v. Souza," where the court held that "The State Aeronautics Commission
Act ...contemplates the use of power of condemnation." '

As a further

argument against the county's contention, the court pointed out that the
California Government Code, Sections 50485-504.14, the very provision
which authorizes local airport, height zoning, contemplates the use of
1 Supra note 11.

"Allocation of Property Interest in Airspace, 20 Univ. of Fla. Law Rev. 237 (1968).
17193 N.E.2d 237 (Ind. 1963).
"Id. at 241. This case found a Taking of private property. See also Roark v. City of Caldwell,
394 P.2d 641 (Idaho 1964); Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v, Evans, 191 So.2d 126
(Miss. 1966). Dutton v. Mendocino County, 1949 U.S. Av. I (Cal. Superior Ct. 1949); Opinion
of Michigan Attorney-General, 1939 U.S. Av. 18 (1939); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash.2d
401, 348 P.2d 664, 77 A.L.R.2d 1344) (1960).
1218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
20Id. at 320. See also Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Validity of Building Height Restrictions, 8 A.L.R.2d 963 (1949).
"1Id. at 319. The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court.
21 Peacock. v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 987, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (Cal. Ct. App.

1968).
23

Id.

Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 498 (1952).
2Id. at 842.
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condemnation where constitutional limitations preclude the exercise of
the zoning power. The court also noted that the California code of Civil
Procedure, section 1239.4, authorizes condemnation of property to protect airport approaches.
Second, the county argued that its actions were a valid exercise of police
power which did not amount to a compensable taking. The cases cited by
the county were distinguished on the basis of facts and findings of reasonableness. While the county obviously has some power to zone, the court
avoided the issue of just how much power the county possessed and avoided
segregating the issue of the constitutionality of airport approach height
zoning. In effect, the county was merely arguing against the findings of
fact.
The county relied heavily upon Harrell's Candy Kitchen2" to support
its argument that its actions were a valid exercise of police power. In
defending the trial court's finding, the appellate court pointed out, by
quoting a previous decision, that reasonableness was the proper test."7
The Candy Kitchen' case had employed the reasonableness test, yet the
court attempted to distinguish Candy Kitchen as a minority decision."
The Candy Kitchen case found a contested ordinance reasonable while the
Peacock court merely found its ordinance unreasonable. The Peacock court
viewed the majority cases as merely consisting of the group which had
found such ordinances invalid and the minority cases as those upholding
such ordinances; while, in fact, the distinction goes to the basic reasoning
of the cases, that is whether or not the reasonableness test is employed.
There seems to be no decision which clearly expresses the basic distinctions between airport aproach height zoning and the ordinary zoning
situation. In fact, the confusion surrounding the whole area of police power
has been criticized.2' The point of signifigence to the still unresolved position of airport approach height zoning is that most courts, in dealing with
the question, have indicated that airport approach height zoning does not
conform with traditional views and purposes of zoning.
Steven W. Stark

2 s111

So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
2 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
28111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
29271 Cal. App. 2d 987, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
30 Jax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964).

